> Talk of moral requirements is just equivalent to talk about a subset of one’s own desires. <
Other than desires relating to non-moral actors and impossible actions, which you mention above, what marks out the subset of desires that you count as moral?
For example, would you consider your desire to marry an eligible person (either now or back when you were still eligible) to confer a moral requirement on that person? (In other words, are you a pantomime villain?)
I agree that when I say that someone has a moral obligation to do something that I am expressing a desire I have for them to act in a certain way. However I am also expressing my beliefs about the desires of westerners in general, and about their willingness to act against those who refuse to do that thing. No matter how much I, personally, desire someone to do something, I would not (honestly) say that they have a moral obligation to do so unless I believed that my desire was widely shared among those I consider at least moderately morally sound, and that refusal to do so would be met by moral disapproval from them.
I also take their claims to imply much the same. If someone told me I was morally required to do something that did not meet the requirements I set out above, then I would disagree with them. They might be implying more with their claims -- or trying to do so -- but unless I would hold the same, then I refuse to consider such as a reason to stop using the moral language.
Do you think you restrict your use of moral terms in similar ways?
It’s difficult to clearly delineate the distinction between moral and non-moral norms. My view on what exactly constitutes a moral norm I would say is similar to what Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart said about what constitutes hardcore pornography:
“I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description, and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it.”
I would not consider my desire to marry someone to confer a moral requirement on that person.
No, my usage of moral terms isn’t as restrictive as your usage. I’m not expressing anything about my beliefs about the desires of other Westerners when I say someone has a moral obligation to do something.
Now I can claim that the majority of your substack is about little ol' me!
> Talk of moral requirements is just equivalent to talk about a subset of one’s own desires. <
Other than desires relating to non-moral actors and impossible actions, which you mention above, what marks out the subset of desires that you count as moral?
For example, would you consider your desire to marry an eligible person (either now or back when you were still eligible) to confer a moral requirement on that person? (In other words, are you a pantomime villain?)
I agree that when I say that someone has a moral obligation to do something that I am expressing a desire I have for them to act in a certain way. However I am also expressing my beliefs about the desires of westerners in general, and about their willingness to act against those who refuse to do that thing. No matter how much I, personally, desire someone to do something, I would not (honestly) say that they have a moral obligation to do so unless I believed that my desire was widely shared among those I consider at least moderately morally sound, and that refusal to do so would be met by moral disapproval from them.
I also take their claims to imply much the same. If someone told me I was morally required to do something that did not meet the requirements I set out above, then I would disagree with them. They might be implying more with their claims -- or trying to do so -- but unless I would hold the same, then I refuse to consider such as a reason to stop using the moral language.
Do you think you restrict your use of moral terms in similar ways?
It’s difficult to clearly delineate the distinction between moral and non-moral norms. My view on what exactly constitutes a moral norm I would say is similar to what Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart said about what constitutes hardcore pornography:
“I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description, and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it.”
I would not consider my desire to marry someone to confer a moral requirement on that person.
No, my usage of moral terms isn’t as restrictive as your usage. I’m not expressing anything about my beliefs about the desires of other Westerners when I say someone has a moral obligation to do something.