Contra Reilly on Name The Trait and Abortion

Why Name The Trait works as an argument for veganism but not as one against abortion

Recently I came across an article by James Reilly called “Abortion and the Name the Trait Argument”.

Reilly starts out his article by explaining what the Name the Trait argument is¹:

A common defense of ethical vegetarianism is the “name the trait” argument (henceforth NTTA), which goes as follows: given that it would be seriously wrong to torture and kill human beings for trivial benefits, then unless there is some morally relevant difference between human beings and non-human animals, it seems that it would also be seriously wrong to do these things to non-human animals. Given that none of the proposed differences (such as intelligence) seem to be morally relevant, it follows that it is seriously wrong to torture and kill animals for trivial benefits, as is done on factory farms.

He then goes on to note that he thinks this argument fails:

As it happens, I don’t think the vegetarian NTTA is successful, since one could simply appeal to a natural-kinds view of personhood, which offers a principled reason for thinking that all human beings are persons, while non-human animals are not.

I do not share this assessment. In fact, not only do I think that Name The Trait works as an argument for ethical vegetarianism, but I think it works as one for ethical veganism as well.

The natural kinds view of personhood is not plausible at all. It fails to offer a credible account of why killing babies as well as severely intellectually disabled humans is wrong. Suppose we take out a DNA scanner and scan all the babies² at a daycare. Upon scanning them, we are informed that these beings who appear to be human infants are actually not human infants at all.

Upon further research, we come to realize that these beings previously thought to be human infants are actually members of an alien species. Furthermore, the beings of this planet always remain in an infant-like state. None of the members of this species have ever been rational nor will ever be rational.

The natural kinds view would seem to imply that it would be permissible to slit the throats of all of these infant-like beings in order to use their corpses for a baby barbecue.

Personally, I think it would be wrong to kill and eat this being.

One may object that such an act would still be impermissible because the killing and eating of these creatures would emotionally upset others - the daycare workers, the humans who are under the mistaken impression that they are these creatures’ biological parents, etc. However, it seems deeply implausible to suggest that this would be the only thing wrong with killing the infant aliens - that we haven’t actually wronged the beings themselves.

If instead we had come across an abandoned baby - then scanned them with the DNA scanner and found out they were from a non-rational alien species - would it then be okay to kill this being? A being that looks, thinks, and acts exactly like a human infant? As long as we’re certain that no other human would find out about this and be emotionally upset by it - a-okay to kill the baby-esque being in order to use their corpse for a BLT? Again, this seems deeply implausible.

Suppose we find another abandoned baby - one who does happen to be human, but who also happens to be in a permanent state of non-consciousness. This being doesn’t and will never experience happiness nor have any desires - they have the mind of a rock.

Given the choice between either killing the permanently non-sentient baby or the infant alien, the natural kinds view would demand we kill the infant alien. Despite the fact that the infant alien is much more similar to a typical human infant in all the morally relevant ways, the natural kinds view delivers the verdict that the infant alien has no right to life whereas the being with the mind of a rock does. This is an absurd result.

Reilly goes on to say the following:

However, it occurs to me that one could repurpose the NTTA, turning it into an argument against abortion. This new argument would go as follows: given that it would be seriously immoral to kill an innocent human adult, then unless there is some morally relevant difference between human adults and unborn human beings, it seems that it would also be seriously wrong to kill unborn human beings. Given that none of the proposed differences (such as sentience, intelligence, or consciousness) seem to be relevant,² it follows that it is seriously wrong to kill unborn human beings.

Note that the aforementioned response to the vegetarian NTTA won’t work here, since unborn human beings belong to the same natural kind as adult human beings. Thus, it seems that the pro-life NTTA is plausibly sound.

I do not think the pro-life iteration of Name The Trait is plausibly sound.³

I reject Reilly’s claim that none of the proposed differences are morally relevant. I think that consciousness/sentience⁴ are in fact morally relevant.

While I do not take sentience to a sufficient condition for it to be seriously wrong to kill a being, I do take it to be a necessary condition for it to be seriously wrong to kill a being. This isn’t to say a being needs to be presently sentient in order to have a right to life - it can be seriously wrong to kill a being that currently lacks sentience but was sentient in the past and will be sentient in the future. For fetuses that aren’t sentient and have never been sentient, we can safely declare that they have no right to life.

In the comments of his article, Reilly says of this view that it’s “bizarre and also subject to counterexamples”, linking a paper by Francis Beckwith that argues against the view.

After reading the relevant sections of the paper, I do not find the purported counterexamples to the view to be compelling.

Beckwith says the following:

Imagine that your father, Bob, was involved in a car accident that put him in a temporarily comatose state. His physician tells you and your mother that although your father will awake from the coma in nine months, his conscious experiences, memories, particular skills and abilities will be lost forever and he will have no mental record of them. This means that he will have to relearn all of his abilities and knowledge as he did before he had any conscious experiences. But they would not be the same experiences and desires he had before. That is, he is in precisely the same position as the standard fetus, with all the basic capacities he had at the beginning of his existence. Thus, if your father has a right life while in the coma, then so does the standard fetus.

To tease this illustration out further, imagine that you have an uncle, Stuart. Stuart is in precisely the same position as Bob, except that Stuart will regain all his memories, prior abilities, etc. and it will take Stuart exactly the same amount of time to reacquire what he has lost as it will for Bob to acquire new memories and relearn old abilities and skills. If I understand correctly Boonin’s view of the right to life it would be permissible to kill Bob but not Stuart, even though the only difference between them would be that the latter will regain what he has lost while the former will gain memories he never had and many abilities he once mastered. Boonin clearly does not want to assert that it is prima facie permissible to kill a reversibly comatose person (p. 123). Yet, given his position, it is prima facie permissible to kill a similarly situated reversibly comatose human being merely on the grounds that he will not be able to reacquire past traits and memories and he will have to relearn skills and abilities he possessed prior to his condition. It seems to me that the difference between Bob and Stuart carries no moral weight whatsoever.

This is not how it seems to me. It seems to me that the difference between Bob and Stuart is of moral importance - that killing Stuart amounts to murder while killing Bob amounts to preventing a person from coming into existence.⁵

Beckwith continues:

Another, though similar, problem with the desire account is its inability to account for the wrongness of purposely creating brainless human beings for an apparent public good. David W. Brock, for example, cites Carol Kahn’s at Pennsylvania State University proposal for a possible use of human cloning, in which she suggests that “after cell differentiation, some of the brain cells of the embryo or fetus [clone] would be removed so that it could then be grown as a brain-dead body for spare parts for its earlier twin” (Brock, 1997, p. E8, citing Kahn, 1989, pp. 14–18). According to Brock, “this body clone would be like an anencephalic newborn or presentient fetus, neither of whom arguably can be harmed, because of their lack of capacity for consciousness.” Yet, Brock maintains, “most people would likely find” the practice of purposely creating non-sentient human beings “appalling and immoral, in part because here the cloned later twin’s capacity for conscious life is destroyed solely as a means to benefit another” (Brock, 1997, pp. E8-E9). It is not precisely clear, given the desire account of rights, what would be wrong with cloning brainless human beings for the purpose of harvesting their organs.

I don’t think there is anything wrong with creating non-sentient humans for the purpose of harvesting their organs - this just seems obviously permissible to me. Such humans are the mental and moral equivalent of rocks. Certainly it’s far more ethical than breeding sentient beings like pigs into existence so we can murder them for their organs. And it’s also far more ethical than murdering beings that are identical to human infants in how they look, act, and think so we can eat their corpses.

I see nothing here that dissuades me from my aforementioned view that sentience is a necessary condition for a right to life.

The vegan version of Name The Trait works, the pro-life iteration doesn’t.

1. Name The Trait, as originally formulated by Isaac Brown, isn’t actually an argument for the impermissibility of eating meat. However, colloquially the term “Name The Trait” is often used to refer to an argument for the impermissibility of killing animals for food. This seems to be the sense of the term Reilly is operating under, and it is the sense I will be using as well.

2. Some may object to my usage of the term “babies” to describe these creatures since they’re not actually human infants. Here, I just use the term as a convenient shorthand for “creatures that appear to be human infants”.

3. Insofar as it argues that it is impermissible to kill non-sentient fetuses. I do think a plausible argument could be advanced in the case of sentient fetuses.

4. I use the terms “consciousness” and “sentience” interchangeably - to refer to subjective experience. However, Reilly seems to take the terms to refer to different things. Some authors use “consciousness” to refer to subjective experience and “sentience” to refer to the ability to feel pleasure and/or pain. I am unsure if this is the same way Reilly is differentiating between the terms.

5. It was pointed out to me after the initial publication of this article that one could take the view that it’s wrong to kill someone who was sentient in the past and will be sentient in the future without accepting that it’s permissible to kill Bob. This is true, but I keep this section in the article because I do accept that it would be permissible to kill Bob.