Do Error Theory and Subjectivism Entail Absurd and Unacceptable Results?

Purported problems with anti-realist theories are often just a matter of misleadingly implying they're saddled with unsavory normative implications that they aren't

Talis has an article titled “Moral Error Theory Is Mistaken Because Genocide Is Wrong”. They start off:

It’s often argued by moral objectivists that non-objectivist views entail absurd and unacceptable results. For example, moral error theory posits that nothing is morally wrong (or right) with genocide (since nothing is wrong or right), moral subjectivism cannot provide the grounds to legitimately criticise those with coherent sets of preferences/beliefs (no matter how vulgar), and so forth.

Moral error theory is (roughly) the metaethical view that morality doesn’t exist, and we’re all in error when making moral claims.
Moral subjectivism is (roughly) the metaethical view that morality is determined by an individual’s preferences and whims–essentially, what we care about.

These absurd and unacceptable results are then utilised as considerations (evidence) against such views, and in favour of moral objectivism–which doesn’t face such entailments

Talis notes that sometimes anti-realists object to these sorts of an argument by accusing them of begging the question. They then go on to say that these arguments don’t actually constitute begging the question and they present some other analogous arguments to demonstrate their point. I won’t dwell on this point because I agree with Talis on it.

It’s quite common for people to advance views without having thought through the entailments of those views, so it’s fine to argue against those views by pointing out their entailments.

The arguments Talis presents against error theory and subjectivism aren’t bad because they’re question-begging, they’re bad because they rely on normative entanglement.

All of the force of their objections come from misleadingly implying that anti-realist views are saddled with unsavory normative implications that they aren’t. Once we get clear on what people who affirm these positions are actually committed to, their objections are left with no bite.

Talis says “error theory posits there is nothing morally wrong (or right) with genocide”. On error theoretic semantics, to say “there is nothing wrong (or right) with genocide” is affirm the following proposition: There is no stance-independent non-natural moral fact that genocide is immoral (or morally right).

This is a proposition that the majority of philosophers and meta-ethicists affirm. According to the PhilPapers survey, just 27% of philosophers and 37% of meta-ethicists are non-naturalists.

The PhilPapers survey results on the meta-ethical views of philsophers in general and meta-ethicists specifically.

This means that if Talis wants to say that this is an “absurd and unacceptable result” on the part of error theory, they’re also committed to saying that the majority of philosophers and meta-ethicists affirm an absurd and unacceptable result.

Now they’re free to say that - I don’t think the fact that a position is held by a majority of philosophers immunizes it from accusations of absurdity, but I just want to be clear on what they’re committed to.

It is important to be clear on what error theorists are not committed to. Talis correctly notes that on error theory, genocide is not wrong - but it’s not right either. The second part is something I see a lot of critics of error theory leave out, so I’m glad to see that Talis took the time to specify that.

However I think it’s important to be even more precise so that readers are left with the correct impression of what error theory actually is. One may mistakenly think “well if error theorists think that genocide is neither wrong nor right, they think it’s just permissible then”. Just to be clear - error theorists do NOT think this.

Error theorists think that all first-order moral claims¹ - Genocide is wrong, Genocide is right, Genocide is permissible - are false. Again, note that when an error theorist says all moral claims are false, they are simply stating that they think there are no stance-independent non-natural moral facts.

It doesn’t mean error theorists are just indifferent to genocide: one can be an error theorist and be just as fiercely opposed to genocide as a staunch moral realist.

With respect to subjectivism, Talis says that it “cannot provide the grounds to legitimately criticise those with coherent sets of preferences/beliefs (no matter how vulgar)” and that it entails that “someone doesn’t have to rescue a drowning child if they don’t care to.”

Subjectivism does not entail that we have an obligation to refrain from criticizing other people’s preferences nor that is permissible for someone to refrain from saving a drowning child if they don’t care to.

The way Talis writes about subjectivism, it is as if they think it is a normative ethical theory that says X is right as long as someone approves of it. But this is not what subjectivism is. It’s a meta-ethical theory that says when people say “X is right” they just mean “I approve of X”.

A subjectivist can consistently affirm the proposition “It is morally obligatory to save a drowning child even if you have no desire to” without contradiction - on speaker subjectivist semantics, this would just amount to affirming the following proposition: “I disapprove of refraining from saving a drown child even if you have no desire to.”

The criticisms Talis lobs at subjectivism would at best only apply to agent subjectivism, not appraiser subjectivism². See this from the SEP on the distinction:

Appraiser relativism suggests that we do or should make moral judgments on the basis of our own standards, while agent relativism implies that the relevant standards are those of the persons we are judging (of course, in some cases these may coincide). Appraiser relativism is the more common position, and it will usually be assumed in the discussion that follows.

Now there are certain things a speaker subjectivist would be committed to. A speaker subjectivist would be committed to saying that if someone who has no desire to save drowning children said “There’s no moral obligation to save children from drowning” they would be saying something true.

But again - let’s be clear on what it means for the speaker subjectivist to say this statement is true. On speaker subjectivism, “There’s no moral obligation to save children from drowning” just amounts to the same proposition as “I have no desire that people save drowning children”. So in saying this statement is true, all the subjectivist is dedicated to is that people who have no desire to save drowning children have no desire to save drowning children.

A speaker subjectivist is not obligated to be okay with this person’s attitude or refrain from judging that their actions are morally wrong. They can think that such a person would be an evil monster - and this judgment is completely compatible with subjectivism.

If there are absurd and unacceptable results of error theory and subjectivism, Talis has not demonstrated them.

1. First-order moral claims are claims about what’s right or wrong, good or bad, etc. Second-order moral claims are claims about first-order moral claims - they consist of statements like “moral judgements lack truth value” and “there are stance-independent moral facts”.

2. I use the terms “appraiser subjectivism” and “speaker subjectivism” interchangeably.